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Petrs urge that CA 8 improperly reversed an
This order would have allowed a merger
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between E. I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co.
Securities Co.

("Du Pont") and Christiana

("Christiana") by finding it exempt from Sect i on

17 of the Investment Company Act of 1940.
II.

FACTS:

-

Christiana is a holding company whose asset

-

portfolio consists mainly

-

(9~/o)

of Du Pont stock.

held by Christiana accounts for approximately
amount of Du Pont stock outstanding.

2~/o

This stock

of the total

--

Christiana is a registered

investment comEany under the Investment company Act of 1940 •
._.....

-=

'

Christiana was initially formed as a control device to
ensure that the Du Pont family continued to control Du Pont.
At the present time, Christina is traded on the over the counter
market; however, ownership in Christiana stock is still highly
concentrated.
I

Those who control Christiana (and control Du Pont

as well) have concluded that Christiana has outlived its
usefulness, and wish to have Christiana disgorge jts Du Pont
stock.

Due to the very low income tax basis of the Du Pont

stock held by Christiana, a taxable transaction would be
unacceptable due to the very large capital gains tax generated
thereby.
Thus it was determined that Christiana should merge taxfree into Du Pont.

The net effect of the transaction would

would be that Christiana stockholders would surrender their
Christiana stock, and receive Du Pont common stock in return.
Essentially, Christiana shareholders would receive pro rata,

-3one share of Du Pont stock for every share of Du Pont stock which
Christiana now holds •.1/
Although this appears straightforward, a problem arises from

-

the fact that Christiana common stock sells over the counter at a
substantial (approximately 28.5%) discount from the market value
of the common stock which Christiana owns.

In other words, for a

$100 investment in Christiana common stock an investor could
acquire a $128.50 indirect ownership of Du Pont stock.
p h enomenon

0

~s

common f or c 1 ose d -endo~nvestment

-----

0

This

y

compan~es,

and

evidentally springs from the corporate ownership of the investment
stock.

For example, Christiana must pay a tax of effectively

upon any dividend which Du Pont pays.

7.~/o

Then if the dividend is

distributed, the Christiana shareholders also have to pay their
personal income tax thereon.

Therefore, there is an added tax

I

- -

1

burden in that such dividends are subject to double taxation when
the holding companies pass the dividends through.

Furthermore,

in the instant case, the income tax basis of Christiana's

1/Actually, Du Pont was to issue shares of its own common stock
equal in value to 97.5% of the net asset value of all Christiana's
assets (approximately 9~/o of which consisted of Du Pont common
stock). Thus, DuPont would receive a 2.5% "discount" on its
common shares received by it.
YEssentially, a closed-end mutual fund (or investment company) is
one whose shares trade at whatever price the market will bear. On
the otherhand, an open-end mutual is one which trades at net asset
value per share -- the market value of the fund~ portfolio, less
liabilities, divided by the number of shares of the fund outstanding.
An open-end fund buys and sells its shares at net asset value; a
closed-end company is sold from one investor to another at whatever
price is agreed upon.

-

-4portfolio is so low that the potential capital gains liability
inhering in the Du Pont stock upon sale reduces the value of
the Du Pont stock.
Section 17(a) of the 1940 Act proscribes mergers between

Svhy..vt
two affiliated corporationsh

-----

t-o H\.Q. AcX:

However, Section 17(b) allows

-

the SEC to issue an order exempting the transaction from
Section 17(a) upon a finding that:
(1) the terms of the proposed transaction,
including the consideration to be paid or
received, are reasonable and fair and do
not involve overreaching on the part of
any person concerned. • • • 11
11

The SEC made such a finding exempting the transaction.

------------~------------------

However, certain minority shareholders of Du Pont sought review
of this order, pursuant to Section 43(a) of the Act.

(Sections

17 & 43 (a) are appended hereto.)

~ the

I

III.

DECISIONS BELOW:

The SEC, by unanimous vote, found

terms of the proposed merger to be fair and reasonable and

to invvlve no overreaching.

The Commission recognized that the

merger dealt with an exchange of stock substantially equivalent
value.

However, it also recognized the substantial benefits

that the merger would confer upon the Christiana stockholders
in that Christiana stockholders would receive Du Pont stock
t~l

based upon the market value of t\fstock, rather than upon the
market value of Christiana's stock itself.

~

(

-5crucial to the SEC's determination of fairness was its

~

- - - - - finding thatlinvestment
t\v'L
company should be valued at the net
<::_
~sset val~e _?~~ ~ tf~lio,

rather than at the market prjce

at which its stock is currently selling.

Appendix at 32 A.

Thus, the SEC viewed the fact that Christiana's shareholders
were to receive value in excess of that which they could then
currently realize upon the market by sale of their shares as

~

d.&.~

~~~~

a benefit to them without corresponding detriment to Du Pont.
Thus the substantial inequality between the market value of
Christiana shares and Du Pont shares, on a pro rata basis, djd
not lead the SEC to conclude that the merger terms were not
fair and reasonable.
Having thus found that Du Pont shareholders did not have
I

a right to share in the tax benefits accruing to Christiana's
shareholders via the merger, and further that the increased
number of Du Pont shares available for sale after the merger
would not significantly depress the price of Du Pont stock,
the SEC concluded that the merger was within the realm of

.,.

fairness.
With a

d~ed

panel,

~evers~ The

essence of CA 8' s

disagreement with the SEC was based upon the SEC's valuation of
Christiana a t_ the net asset value of its portfolio.

CA 8 found

that the SEC erred in deciding as a matter of law that net asset
value is the proper valuation technique.

CA 8, citing income

(

0

,~t) ~ Q.s+-~k

-6-

ktax cases, felt that the market value of the Chrjstiana's shares
l-=

.....

was the relevant value to be used.

CA 8 found that the merger

negotiation was not at arms-length, and that, valuing Christiana
at its market value, the benefits to Christiana shareholders
far outweighed those to Du Pont shareholders.

CA 8 concluded

that "there is nof. substantial evidence on the basis of this
record to support the Commission's finding • • • ".
In attempting to analyze the case, CA 8 appointed
Roger Upson, Associate Dean of the University of Minnesota,
College of Business Administration, to serve as consultant to
assist the court "in understanding the record in this case
to prepare reports and memoranda for this court in connection
with that function."

Appendix at 91 A.

Judge Stephenson, dissenting, accorded '" great weight to the
findings of the SEC below, and concluded that "'the Commission's
action is based upon substantial evidence and js consistent with
the authority granted by Congress.'
Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332

u.s.

Securities and Exchange
194, 207 (1946) ."

Petrs' petn for rehearing en bane were denied by an equally
divided court.
IV.

CONTENTIONS:

The SEC and the corporations contend

that ·CA 8 was wrong in rejecting the SEC's use of net asset
value, and in finding the merger not fair.

They argue that

CA 8 should have been guided by this Court's pronouncement in

I

-7Securities and Exchange Commission v • .chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194,

209 (1946):

"Tb. c Commission
. . 's conr Juswn
•
here rests ~quare]y m t~at area where administrill i ·;e jud,g,!,,11,~nts
are
tl d to the greatest amonnt of wei (Tht
by appe a e cou1. s.
Is JC pro uc o administrative experience, apprec:iation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the
uncontested facts. It is the type of judgment
which administrative agencies are best equipped
to make and ''hich justifies the use of the administrative process. See Republtc Aviation Corp. Y.
Labor Board, 324 U.S. 793, 800. vVhether we
agree or disagree with the result reached, it is
an allowable judgment which \Ve cannot disturb."

Under this standard, petrs urge, the SEC's findings of fairness
should not have been disturbed.
The SEC also argues that CA 8's opinion wjll create substantial
uncertainty regarding the standards of fairness for Section 17
transactions; the SEC has heretofore consistently used the net

The corporate petrs also object to CA 8's going "outside of
the record" by its employment of Dean Upson as a consultant.
V.

DISCUSSION:

The issue of whether the transaction is

"fair" is a difficult one.

On the one hand, Du Pont would suffer

no ostensible detriment from the exchange of its shares for a
~

-

greater number of its shares; on the other hand, Du Pont would
never agree to an arm's-length transaction which benefits it so

-
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slightly and the other \.siu~ s 9 greatly witho
attempting to
~
negotiate a portion of the
itself.
In effect,
.D\1) C? CTV\'·tthe affiliation of Du Pont and ch,zistian caused the .
. ·-

~ -. ~.J

/

~,··

~~~
'').trY '

.J

~~

amount ~~~
1

shareholders to bear an opportunity

equal to the

~

that an arm's-length merger partner would "pay" DuPont to
induce it to enter into the transaction.
CA 8 rested heavily upon the fact that, using the market

value of Christiana stock as the measurement standard, Du Pont
would have received far less than would the Christiana shareholders,
./

who would have received a 28.5% premium -- about a half billion
dollars -- for their stock.

One of the most significant factors

causing this 28.5% discount is the unrealized cap i tal gains tax
liability inherent in Christiana's DuPont stock.

However, in

a tax free reorganization, Christiana shareholders would get a
I

carry-over basis.
.

h

1.

.

See I.R.C. § 358.

.

Since the basis of the

.

C r1st1ana stock 1n the hands of 1ts shareholders

.

JS

.

also qu1te

low -- see appendix at 88a -- there would also be a very
substantial unrealized capital gains tax inhering in the "new"
Du Pont stock.
not

--

Hence, the "bonanza"

as large as CA 8 would have us believ

I~

large

extent the effect of unrealized capital gains will depress the

here

~ay

1

~ax

~

dstill be signhificant
afdvadntabge s since.this
oes erase t e potent1a
or ou 1 e taxat1on _
. -- i.e., due to the disparities (1) between the bas]s of
Christiana's DuPont stock and DuPont market value, and (2)
between the basis of Christiana's shares in the hands of jts
shareholders and Christiana's market value.

~-~ Pafisact1on

(

-9-

----

intrinsic value of the new Du Pont shares to the

sa~

extent

-

that it did the market value of Christiana shares.
At any rate, the issue of whether, in fact, the merger
terms were "fair" under section 17 is ' intriguing, although
perhaps not certworthy per se.
Although the SEC attempts to urge otherwise, the proper
standard for valuation of investment companies for purposes of
section 17 does not appear, standing alone, to be important
eno~gh,

recurrent enough, or confused enough to command this

Court's attention.
The primary impetus for cert must flow from the approach

-----

used by CA 8 in reversing the SEC.

CA 8 characterized the

SEC as holding, as a matter of law, that the net asset value
standard is the appropriate standard under which to measure

I
I

value.

CA 8 thus found the SEC "wrong on the law."
-------~

._.41Wii11~

. . .- - - - - . . - - - - -

This approach strikes me as a rather thinly veiled attempt
at evading the review standards set forth in Chenery and i n
section 43(a) of the 1940 Act.

.Y

I do not read the SEC's opinion

as"holding" the net asset value standard necessary as a matter
of law.

Valuation is the key to fairness; value js a factual

question and the SEC's use of net asset value in the case of an

.1/Section 43 (a) provides, inter alia:
"the findings of the Commissjon
as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.

-10-

investment company is supportable, and not an error of law (at
least until CA 8 found it to be so.)

Thus, the SEC's conclusions

do seem to be supported by substantial evidence, and by the SEC's
factual analysis, and should have been protected on appeal.
The mere fact that CA 8 had to hire the consultant to help
it "understand the record" only illustrates the deference that
CA 8 should have given, but did not give, to the SEC determinations.
Moreover, this Court has only recently warned courts of appeal to
stay within the record on review.

FPC v. Transcontinental Gas

Pipe Line Corp., 44 U.S.L.W. 3413 (January 19, 1976).
The fact that CA 8 arguably disregarded the proper standard
review argues for some action by this Court.

However, there is

no argument below about what that standard is; the only real
issue therein is whether CA 8 effectively circumnavigated the
deferential standard of review by casting the SEC's employment of
net asset value as an error of law.

Thus, if cert were to be

--

granted, what this Court might really end up doing is addressing

There is a response.
8/10/76

Eagan

Op. in SEC appx.

-

-----

3

§ 17 (a) It shall be unlawful for any affiliated
person or promoter of or principal undenuiter
for a registered investment company (other than
a company of the character described in f'ection
80a-12(d)(3)(A) and (B) of this title), or any
affiliated person of such a person, promoter, or
principal undenrriter, acting as principal(!) knowingly to sell any security or other
property to such reg-istered company or to
any company controlled by such registered
company, ...
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this
section, any person may file with the Commission
an application for an order exempting a proposed
transaction of the applicant from one or more
provisions of said subsection. The Colil.Iill ssion
shall grant such application and issue such order
of exemption if evidence establishes that(1) the terms of the proposed transaction,
including the consideration to be paid or
received, are reasonable and fair and do not
involve O\erreaching on the part of any person concerned;
(2) the proposed transaction is consistent
with the polic~~ of each registered investment
company concerned, as recited in its registration statement and reports filed under this
subchapter; and
(3) the proposed transaction is consistent
with the general purposes of this subchapter.
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chapter may obtain a re\·Iew or sncu uJ. u\;.. ~.u
the United States Court of Appeals \Yit.hin any
circuit wncrein such per~on resides or has his
principal plnce of business. or in the United
States Conrt. of A ppcals for the District of
Columbia, by filin~ in l'uch rnurt, within sixty
days after the entry of such order, a written
petition pra~·ing that the order of the Conunission be modified or set aside in whole or in part.
* * * Upon the filing of such petition such court
shall haYe the jurisdiction, which upon the filing
of the record shall be exclusive, to afiirm, modify, or set aside such order, in whole or in part.
No objection to the order of the Commission
shall be considered bv the court unless such objection shall have beei1 urged before the Collll11ission or unless there were reasonable grounds for
failure so to do. The findings of the Commission
as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. If application is made
to the court for leave to adduce additional e-vidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the
court that such additional evidence is material
and that there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce such eYidence in the proceeding before the Commission, the court may order such
additional evidence to be taken before the Commission and to be adduced upon the bearing in
such manner and upon such terms and conditions
as to the court may seem proper. The Commission
may modify its findings as to the facts by reason
of the additional cYidence so taken, and it shall
file :w ith the court such modified or new findings,
which, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive, and its recommendation, if any,
for the modification or setting aside of the original order. * * *
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TO:

MRo JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

Gene Corney

RE:

Nos. 75-1870 & 75-1872, SEC v. Collins
BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO

When the petitions for cert first came before the Conference,
I recommended that you vote to grant in these two cases.

I was then

of the view that CA8 failed to give appropriate deference to the SEC's
interpretation of the statute (which the SEC was charged to enforce).
After considering this matter carefully on the merits, I am now of
the view that the SEC is wrong and CA8 is right: net asset value is
not the determinative factor with respect to the "fairness" of mergers
o f this sort.
A.

BACKGROUND
Under section 17 of the Act, mergers between investment companies

and their affiliates can be consummated only if the SEC finds that
t hey are "reasonable and fair and do not involve overreaching on
the part of any person concernedo"

The SEC has generally note required

as a precondition to its approval that the parties to the merger
apportion the benefits generated by the merger.

The issue is

whether this is the correct approach to the statute.
Christiana's only alternative to a merger with du Pont would have
been liquidation under section 333 of the IRC, which could have resulted in a tax liability of between 8.5% and
assets measured by their market value.

17o2% of Christiana's

The SEC approved the tax free

merger between du Pont and Christiana, even though it recognized the

@

clear "imbalance of benefit" in the terms of the merger.

As the SEC

viewed the transaction, the merger with the 2.5% discount would
not injure the du Pont shareholders.

And it is clear that it would

help the Christiana shareholders by maintaining subttantially the
entire value of their investment.

The SEC thus found the merger to

be within the "range of fairness'' mandated by the statute.

CAB reversed,

finding significant the gross disparity in benefits between the two
groups of shareholders.
B.

THE CONCEPT OF FAIRNESS
I gather from the briefs that we are not going to get much

help from the legislative history with respect to whether Congress
thought this type of merger was fair or unfair.

As an economist,

I find it easiest to treat the concept of "fairness" with respect to
deals in terms of what the market will bear.

If for now we put

to one side the problems involved when the transaction is, for one
reason or another, not an arm's length bargain, a "fair" price is
the market price.

When two parties negotiate a transaction, it is

usually because there are benefits to be gained by both sides.

The

distribution of those benefits will depend on relative bargaining
strength:

how badly do you need what the other fellow has to offer.

In other words, the terms of the bargain depend on what each party
brings to the bargain and how badly the other party needs it.
This view finds support in some of our cases dealing with
the concept of a "just and reasonable" standard.

,,

Schwabacher v. United States, 334

u.s.

For example, in

182, 199, we interpreted the

just and reasonable" standard of the Transportation Act of 1940

~

as requiring that it is not what a stockholder "once put into a
constituent company but what value he is contributing to the merger
that is to be made good."
It is of course possible to argue that Christiana is bringing
to this merger its assej ts--primarily du Pont stock--since the effect
of the proposed merger is a transfer of those assests o Under that
view, one could then argue that Christiana's compe~ sation should be
valued not on the a market value of its stock, but on the market
value of its assets.

The problem with that approach is that itJ

takes only a superficial look at the transactiono

The purpose of

this transaction is not to bring to duPont Christiana's assets;
standing alone, there is no economic incentive for du Pont to purchase
from Christiana its own shares and then reissue new shares in their
place.

The real purpose behind this transaction is to realize the

substantial tax benefits that flow from this type of tax free merger.
From this view, what Christiana br:i.ags to du Pont is an oppo:.::.t unity
fur the two to get together and accomplish a tax savings that will be
unavailable to Christina if it pursued any of its other options o
Christiana needs du Pont badly in this transaction, since du Pont is
the only available party which can accomplish tax free status o
And Christiana brings with it an opportunity for a huge tax savings.
Du Pont of course brings to the bargain the other side of the coin:

it brings the opportunity for tax free status and is no doubt willing
to accept part of the tax "bounty" in exchange for its role in the deal.
If these two parties got together and worked out an arrangement
at arm's length, I am certain that the terms of the deal would have
been far different than those approved by the SECo

?
'

C.

THE OPPORTUNITY FOR "UNFAIRNESS"

The SEC enters this case precisely because Congress recognized
that certain transactions involvet a

,.· a"··f··cMA.l

~

opportunity for unfairnesso

With respect to affiliated companies, Congress wanted to deal with
the possibility that the "dominant" firm would force unfair terms
upon, and thereby injure, the "minor" firm.

Thus, Congress required

that the SEC give prior approval only to those mergers between affiliated
companies that were "fair and reasonable and did not involve overreaching
on the part of any person concerned."
If one presented the facts of this case to a group of economists
and a sked them to explain the factors influencing the terms of this

/? bargain now before us, I am absolutely certain that the oonsensus
\

would be that Christiana controlled or influenced the du Pont decision
to accept the terms through something other than the legitimate
exercise of bargaining power at arm's length.

Here, Christiana is

the dominant party, the merger provides an opportunity for it to
obtain terms more favorable than it would otherwise obtain, and the
terms in fact turn out to exhibit a clear imbalance.

Why then

should the merger be approved as fair and reasonable?
The only reason I can think of is that it is important to
preserve the net asset value of shares in investment companies.
v ... v i ou.s

This may well be part of the purpose of theAprovisions of the statute
at issue.

But the very provision under scrutiny at this time requires

fairness to ALL parties to the bargain, which means du Pont as well
as Christiana.
r1
domin~

Du

Pont.

Moreover, here it is Christiana which is the

party, and if either party is to be preferred it should be

It might nonetheless be contended that the du Pont shareholders
should not complain that the deal is unfair, since there is likely
to be no effect on the price of their shares and the value of
their investment.

But that is a rather odd concept of fairness:

present position remains unchanged.

In a very meaningful

your

~\

c pp9~~A1E~

du Pont shareholders are injured--they have missed a good
corporate opportunity.
sounds familiar.
IBM stock.

Take the following hypothetical, which probably

Suppose Christiana's assets consisted solely of

Also assume that du Pont had ten shares of common outstanding,

with ten shareholders each holding one share.
shareholders also happen to

~

Two of the du Pont

two shareholders of Christiana.

Indeed, we can even assume that they are the two only shareholders
of Christiana.

Now let's suppose that due to some quirk in the

tax laws the Christiana shareholders can merge with du Pont and
only du Pont to realize the same tax savings as is at issue in this
~....,____

case.

So the two Christiana shareholders go to duPont management

and say:

look, if we merge with you in this fashion the value of

du Pont shares will remain unchanged, and we can ourselves realize
this

~uge

tax savings.

Since we also happen to be du Pont shareholders,

why don't you do us this favor and let us reap this 100,000 tax benefit.
The duPont management would be crazy if it didn't insist on
sharing the tax savings with the Christiana people.

The fact that

the Christiana shareholders also happen to be duPont shareholders,
and that du Pont shares would not decrease in value is irrelevant.
If duPont insists on a 50/50 split of the tax savings, each duPont
.a.hareholder would "get" 1/10 th of 50,000, or 5, 000.

This is true

of the two christiana shareholders who are du Pont shareholders.

tJA

~

But if du Pont instead insists on no share of the benefit, or as
rere only a marginal share, the full value goes to the two Christiana
shareholders--who are also du Pont shareholders--at 50,000 each.
What reason is there for such a result1
Du Pont management would never enter into such a deal knowingly
and voluntarily.

If the deal went through under the terms proposed

in the instant case, the presumption would be that du Pont management

was negligent, that it had been coerced by the controlling influence
of Christiana, or that du Pont management had colluded with the
Christiana shareholders for an under- the- table share of the tax
evings.

With management as sophisticated as it is today, I think

we can reject the first possible inference as unrealistic.

With

respect to either of the other two possibilities, the deal is
inherently unfair and unreasonable to du Pont stockholders.
D.

THE ROOT PROBLEM
A good deal of confusion can be caused by looking at this case

in terms of whether Christiana shareholders are "entitled" to the

tax

~benefits

in the first place, and whether it is unfair to deprive

them of the benefits to which they are entitled.

In my view, the

Christiana shareholders long ago attached certain restrictions and
limitations on their shares by putting them into this holding company.
They did so for good reason:
device .

they wanted to use Christiana as a control

The fact that that control device has outlived its useful-

ness does not mean that they should

~

be able to avoid the restrictions

placed on their shares without paying for the fact those retrictions
brought them benefits for a number of years.

The very

~

purp~ose

of the

Act seems to be to keep Christiana from forcing a "bad deal" on
du Pont.

To say that the deal if is"fair" since it does not injure

du Pont stops at a superficial level.

The deal is fair since you

didn't get hurt in terms of a decline in present value.

But the

deal is appropriately characterized as a ~ bad deal~ -and thus in my
view as an unfair deal--because du Pont

share~olders

lost the

opportunity to increase the value of what they owned.

I realize that we normally give considerable deference to
the interpretation of a statute offered by the agency charged with
enforcement of the statute.

But this interpretation makes no

economic sense, and I would reject the agency's interpretation.
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Du Pont v. Collins
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Collins

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE
Court.
We granted certiorari

.!/

in this case

whether the Securities and Exchange Commission, in approving
the merger of a closed-end investment company into an
affiliate company, reasonably exercised its discretion under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT 789, as
15 U.S.C. §80a-l et seq.

a~ended,

The Commission valued the investment

company essentially on the basis of the market value of the
securities which constituted substantially all of its assets
rather than on the lower basis of its own outstanding stock.
The statutory scheme here is relatively straightforward.
Section 17 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15

u.s.c.

80(a)-17, forbids an "affiliated person," as defined in the

1/
- 429

u.s.

815 (1976) .

~

- 2 -

Act,

~I

to purchase any securities or other property from a

registered investment company unless the Commission finds,
inter alia, that the "evidence establishes that . . . the
terms of the proposed transaction, including the consideration
to be paid or received, are reasonable and fair and do not
involve overreaching on the part of any person concerned. .

2/
- 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a) (3) defines an "affiliated person"
as follows:
(3)
"Affiliated person" of another person
means (A) any person directly or indirectly owning,
controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5 per
centum or more of the outstanding voting securities
of such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum
or more of whose outstanding voting securities are
directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held
with power to vote, by such other person; (C) any
person directly or indirectly controlling,
controlled by, or under common control with, such
other person; (D) any officer, director, partner,
copartner, or employee of such other person;
(E) if such other person is an investment company,
any investment adviser thereof or any member of an
advisory board thereof; and (F) if such other
person is an unincorporated investment company not
having a board of directors, the depositor thereof.

3/
-Section 17(b) also requires that:
i - the
proposed transaction be consistent with the policy of each
registered investment company concerned, and ii consistent with "the general purposes of this subchapter."
15 U.S.C. 80a-17 (b) (2) (3). These criteria are not
contested here.

II

~/

-

3 A

(l)

The merger in this case involves Christiana Securities

Company, a closed-end, non-diversified management investment
company, and E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company, a large
industrial operating company engaged principally in the
manufacture of chemical products.

Christiana was formed in

1915 in order to preserve family control
~-

of ~ DuPont

At the time the present merger negotiations were

announced in April 1972, 98% of Christiana's assets consisted

4/
of Du Pont common stock.-

This block of Du Pont stock in

turn comprised approximately 28.3% of the outstanding common
5/
stock of the Du Pont Corporation.For purposes of this
litigation, Christiana has been presumed to have at least the
potential to control Du Pont, although it submits that "this
potential lies dormant and unexercised and that there is no
actual control relationship."

Investment Company Act Release

No. 8615/December 13, 1974, 5 S.E.C. Docket 745, 747 (1974).

4/
-Christiana owns 13,417,120 shares of DuPont,
It also
holds a relatively small amount of Du Pont preferred stock.
Its other assets consist of two daily newspapers in
Wilmington, Delaware and 3.5% of the stock of the Wilmington
Trust Company which, in turn, holds more than one half of
Christiana's common stock as trustee.
Investment Company Act
Release No. 8615/December 13, 1974.
5/
-According to the applicants' "Notice of Filing of
Application", Investment Company Act Release No. 7402, DuPont
has 47,566,694 shares of common stock outstanding held by
approximately 224,964 shareholders.

o(
J

- 4 Christiana itself has 11,710,103 shares of common stock

6/
outstanding-

and has about eight thousand shareholders.

Unlike Du Pont stock, which is traded actively on the New York
and other national stock exchanges, Christiana shares are
traded in the over-the-counter market.

Since virtually all of

its assets are Du Pont common stock, the market price of
Christiana shares reflects the market price of Du Pont stock.
However, as

is~

case with closed-end investment

companies, Christiana's own stock has historically sold at a
7/
discount from the market value of its Du Pont holdings.Apparently, this disdount is primarily tax-related since
Christiana pays a federal intercorporate tax on dividends.

~~~A~

Its

stockholders are also subject to pote~ial capital gains tax
A

on the unrealized appreciation of Christiana's Du Pont stock
which has a very low tax base.

Additionally, the relatively

limited market for Christiana stock likely influences the
discount.

~

In 1972, Christiana's management concluded that, because
of the tax disadvantages and the discount at which its shares

y
95.5% of these shares are held by 338 people.
Investment Company Act Release No. 8615/December 13, 1974.
!_I

In the two years preceding the date of the announcement
of the merger negotiations, this discount was generally in
the range of 20-25%.
Investment Company Act Release No. 8615,
December 13, 1974.

-
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sold, Christiana should be liquidated and its stockholders
become direct owners of Du Pont stock.

Christiana's board

of directors proposed liquidation of Christiana by means of a
tax-free merger into Du Pont Corporation.

Du Pont would

purchase Christiana's assets by issuing to Christiana shareholders new certificates of Du Pont stock.

In more concrete

terms, Du Pont would acquire Christiana's $2.2 billion assets
and assume its liabilities of approximately $300,000.

In so

doing, DuPont would acquire from Christiana 13,417,120 shares
of its own common stock.

DuPont would then issue 13,228,620

of its shares directly to Christiana holders.

This would be

188,500 shares less than Du Pont would receive from Christiana
a ratio of 1.123 shares of Du Pont for each share of
Christiana.

This ratio was ascertained by taking the market

price of Christiana's DuPont stock and its other assets,
subtracting Christiana's relatively nominal liabilities, and
making certain other minor adjustments.

Direct ownership of

Du Pont shares would increase the market value of the
Christiana shareholders' holdings and Du Pont would have
acquired Christiana's assets at a 2.5% discount from their net
value.

The Internal Revenue Service ruled the merger would be

tax-free.
(2)

Du Pont and Christiana filed a joint application with the

Commission for exemption under §17 of the Investment Company

- 6 Act.

Administrative proceedings followed.

The Commission's

Division of Investment Management Regulation supported the
application.

A relatively small number of Du Pont shareholders,

including the respondents in this case, opposed the transaction.
Their basic argument was that, since Christiana was valued on
the basis of its assets, Du Pont stock, rather than the much
lower market price of its own outstanding stock, the proposed
merger would be unfair to the shareholders of Du Pont since it
provides relatively greater benefits to Christiana shareholders
than to shareholders of Du Pont.

The objecting stockholders

argued that Du Pont Corporation should receive a substantial
share of the benefit realized by Christiana shareholders from
the elimination of the 23% discount from net asset value at
which Christiana stock was selling.

They also argued that the

merger would depress the market price of Du Pont stock because
it would place more than 13 million marketable Du Pont shares
directly in the hands of Christiana shareholders.
After the hearing, the parties waived the initial administrative recommendations and the record was submitted directly
to the Commission.
application.

The Commission unanimously granted the

Basically, it viewed the proposed transaction as

an exchange of equivalents - Christiana's Du Pont stock to be
acquired by Du Pont in exchange for Du Pont stock issued
directly to Christiana shareholders.

It held that, for purposes

- 7 of §17(b), the proper guide for evaluating Christiana was the
market price of Christiana's holdings of DuPont stock:
''Here justice requires no ventures into the unknown
and . the unknowable. An investment company, whose
assets consist entirely or almost entirely of
securities, the prices of which are determined in
active and continuous markets, can normally be
presumed to be worth its net asset value . . . .
The simple, readily usable-tool of net asset value
does the job much better than an accurate guage
of market impact (were there one) could." 5 S.E.C.
Docket, at 751.
The fact that Du Pont might have obtained more favorable
terms because of its strategic bargaining position or by use
of alternative methods of liquidating Christiana was considered
not relevant by the Commission.

In its view, the purpose of §17

was to prevent persons in a strategic position from getting more
than fair value.

The Commission found no detriment in the

transaction to Du Pont or to the value of its outstanding
shares.

Any depressing effects on the price of Du Pont would

be brief in duration and the intrinsic value of an investment
in Du Pont would not be altered by the merger.

Moreover, in the

Commission's view, any valuation involving a significant
departure from net asset value would "run afoul of §17(b) (1) of
the Act"; it would strip long-term investors in companies like
Christiana of the intrinsic worth of the securities which
underlie their holdings.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit divided in setting aside the Commission's

- 8 -

8/
determination.

532 F.2d 584 (1976) .-

The majority held

that the Securities and Exchange Commission had erred, as a
matter of law, in determining that Christiana should be
presumptively valued on the basis of the market value of its
principal asset, common stock of Du Pont.

"[I]n judging

transactions between dominant and subserviant parties, the
test is 'whether or not under all the circumstances the

trans~

action carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain'
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-307 (1939)
omitted)," 532 F.2d, at 592.

(footnote

Employing this standard, the

Court of Appeals majority concluded the record did not support
the Commission's finding that the terms of the merger were
"reasonable and fair" since the "economic benefits to Christiana
shareholders from the merger are immediate and substantial,"
532 F.2d, at 601, while "benefits to present Du Pont shareholders are minimal."

Id., at 602.

The court concluded that,

from DuPont's viewpoint, "the degree of [control] dispersion
attained . . . does not justify the substantial premium paid
for the Christiana stock," id., at 603.

The panel also held

that the Commission had erred in failing to give weight to the
"occasional detriment to DuPont shareholders," id., at 605,
caused by the increase of available Du Pont stock in the market.

8/
- A petition for rehearing en bane was denied by an
equally divided court.

- 9 -
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B

In determining whether the Court of Appeals correctly
set aside the order of the Commission, we begin by examining
the nature of the regulatory process whose decision that court
was required to review.

In United States v. National Assn. of

Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975), we noted that the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §80a-l et seq, "vests
in the SEC broad regulatory authority over the business
practices of the investment companies."

422 U.S., at 704-705.

The Act was the product of Congressional concern that existing
legislation in the securities field did not afford adequate
protection to the purchasers of investment company securities.
Prior to the enactment of the legislation, Congress mandated

9/
an intensive study of the investment company industry.-

One

of the problems specifically identified was the numerous transactions between investment companies and persons affiliated
with them which resulted in a distinct advantage to the
10/
"insiders" over the public investors.Section 17 was the

9/
- Section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act,
49 STAT 837, 15 U.S.C. §792-4, mandated that Congress undertake
such a study. See United States v. National Assn. of
Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 704 (1975).
10/
See generally Report
Companies, Pt. III, Ch. IV,
Shifts in Control, Mergers,
Companies". H. R. Doc. No.
pp. 1017-1562.

on Investment Trust and Investment
"Problems in Connection with
and Consolidations of Investment
279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.,

- 10
11/
specific Congressional response to this problem.--

Congress

therefore charged the Commission, in scrutinizing a merger
such as this, to take into account the peculiar characteristics
of such a transaction in the investment company industry.
Recognizing that an "arm's length bargain," cf. Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), is rarely a realistic possibility
in transactions between an affiliate and an investment company,
Congress substituted, in effect, the informed judgment of the
Commission to determine, inter alia, whether the transaction
was "reasonable and fair and did not involve overreaching on
12/
the part of any person concerned.,,-Given the wide variety of possible transactions between
an investment company and its affiliates, Congress, quite
understandably, made no attempt to define this standard with
any greater precision.

Instead, it followed the practice

frequently employed in other administrative schemes.

The

language of the statute was cast in broad terms and designed to
encompass all situations falling within the scope of the
statute; an agency with great experience in the industry was

While the House and Senate Reports indicate that the
Congress' chief concern was protection of the public investors
of the investment company, S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. 14 (1940); H. R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 9
(1940), the statute has been construed to afford protection to
the stockholders of the affiliate as well. See Fifth Avenue
Coach Lines, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 635, 639 (1967).
15 U.S.C. 80a-17 (b) (1).

- 11 given the task of applying those criteria to particular
business situations in a manner consistent with the legislative
13/
intent.-

c
In this case, a judgment as to whether the terms of the
merger were "fair and reasonable" turned upon the value assigned
to Christiana.

In making such an evaluation, the Commission

concluded that "[t]he single, readily usable tool of net asset
value does the job much better than an accurate guage of market
impact.

"

5 S.E.C. Docket, at 751.

Investment companies,

it reasoned, are essentially a portfolio of securities whose
individual prices are determined by the forces of the securities
marketplace.

In determining value in merger situations, "asset

value" is thus much more applicable to investment companies
than to other corporate entities.

The value of the securities

surrendered is, basically, the real value received by the
transferee.

13/
This situation is quite different from that which
confronted the Court earlier this Term in Piper v. Chris-Craft
Industries,
U.S.
(1977). There, the Court held that
"the narrow legal issue" of implying a private right of action
under the securities laws was "one peculiarly reserved for
judicial resolution" and that the experience of the Commission
on such a question was of "limited value."
U.S.
n. 27.
Moreover, the Commission's Chairman, in testimony before Congress
on the relevant legislation, had taken a position opposed to
that asserted by the Commission's amicus brief in Piper. By
contrast, this case does not involve a purely legal determination but, rather, an assessment as to whether a given business
arrangement is compatible with the regulatory scheme which the
agency is charged by Congress to administer.

- 12 In reviewing a decision of the Commission, a court must
consider both the facts found and the application of the
relevant statute by the agency.

Congress has mandated that,

in review of §17 proceedings, "[t)he findings of the
Commission as to facts, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive."

15 U.S.C. §80a-42.

A reviewing court

is also to be guided by the "venerable principle that the
construction of a statute by those charged with its execution
should be followed unless there are compelling indications
that it is wrong . . . . "
367, 381 (1969).

Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S.

"[C)ontemporaneous construction is entitled

to great weight . . . even though it was applied in cases
settled by consent rather than by litigation.''
Bros., 359 U.S. 385 (1959).

FTC v. Mandel

Here, however, the Court of Appeals

held, as a matter of law, that the Commission erred in the method
applied in passing on the merger, thus all but ignoring the
Congressional limitations on judicial review of agency action.
The Commission has long recognized that the key factor in
the valuation of the assets of a closed-end investment company
should be the market price of the underlying securitiesw

This

method of setting the value of investment companies is, as
Congress contemplated, the product of the agency's long and
intimate familiarity with the investment company industry.
instance, in issuing an advisory report to the United States

For

- 13 -
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District Court pursuant to Section 1703 of Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act, the Commission advised that "it is natural
that net asset value based upon market prices should be the
fundamental valuation criterion used by and large in the
investment company field."

Central States Electric Corporation,

30 S.E.C. 680, 700 (1949), approved, sub nom Central States
Electric Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879, 884 (CA 4, 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 917 (1951).

Similarly, in mergers like

the one presented in this case, the Commission has used "net
asset value" as a touchstone in its analysis.

See, e.g.

Delaware Realty and Investment Company, 40 S.E.C. 469, 473
(1961); Harbor Plywood Corp. and Hunt Foods and Industries, Inc.,
40 S.E.C. 1002 (1962); Eastern States Corporation, Investment
14/
Company Act Releases Nos. 5693 and 5711 (1969).-14/
-- This method of valuation of closed-end investment
companies was similarly employed in Elt, Inc., Investment
Company Act Release No. 8675 and 8714, Chemical Fund, Inc.,
Investment Company Act Release No. 8773, The Cit1zens and
Southern Capital Corp., Investment Company Act Release No.
7755 and 7802, Detroit and Clevand Navigation Company, Investment Company Act Release No. 3082 and 3099, Cheapside Dollar
Fund Limited, Investment Company Act Release No. 9038 and 9085,
Abacus Fund, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 7053 and
7094. The Commission has, of course, required that such
valuations be adjusted to reflect such factors as expenses of
the merger and tax considerations. Tally Industries, Inc.,
Investment Company Act Release No. 5953 and Electric Bond and
Share Company, Investment Company Act Release No. 5215, cited
by the Court of Appeals, did not rely on net asset value since
the companies held substantial assets other than securities.
While Christiana also had some assets other than Du Pont stock,
theyamounted to only 2% of its assets.

- 14 Moreover, despite the characterization of the Court of
Appeals to the contrary, the Commission did not employ a
mechanical application of a rule or "presumption".

It

considered carefully the contentions of the respondents that
a departure from the use of net asset value was warranted in
this case.

Upon analysis, it concluded that the central and

controlling aspect of the merger remained the fact that it
consisted of an exchange of Du Pont common stock for Du Pont
common stock; it was not Christiana stock but Du Pont stock
which Du Pont was receiving ·in the merger.

As to the claim

that Du Pont stock would be adversely affected over an extended
period of time by volume selling, the Commission concluded there
was no indication of a long-term adverse market impact.

It

noted that Christiana stock was held principally by long-term
investors . . There was no evidence that Christiana stockholders,
who for years had been indirect investors in Du Pont, would now
change the essential nature of their investment.
The Commission's reliance on "net asset value" in this
particular case and its consequent determination that the
proposed merger met the statutory standards thus rested
"squarely in that area where administrative judgments are
entitled to the greatest amount of weight by the appellate
courts.

It is the product of administrative experience,

appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization

- 15 of the statutory policies, and reasonable treatment of the
uncontested facts."
(1947).

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209

In rejecting the conclusion of the Commission, the

Court of Appeals substituted its own judgment for that of the
agency charged by Congress with that responsibility.

Indeed,

after receiving briefs in oral argument, the Court of Appeals over the objection of the Commission, Christiana and Du Pont undertook the unique appellate procedure of employing a

----

university professor to assist the court in understanding the
record in this case and to prepare reports and memoranda for
the court.

Thus, the reports relied upon by that court included

a variety of data and economic observations which had not been
examined and tested by the traditional methods of the adversary
process.

We are not cited to any statute, rule, or decision

authorizing the procedure employed by the Court of Appeals.
Cf. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 16.
In our view, the Court of Appeals clearly departed from
its statutory appellate function and applied an erroneous
standard in its review of the decision of the Commission.

The

record made by the parties before the Commission was in accord
with traditional procedures and that record clearly reveals
substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commission.
Moreover, the agency conclusions of law were based on a
construction of the statute consistent with the legislative
intent.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

reversed.
REVERSED
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MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari 1 in this case to determine whether
the Securities and Exchange Commission, in approving the
merger of a closed end investment company into an affiliate
company, reasonably exercised its discretion under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15
('. S. C. ~ 80a- 1 et seq. The Commission valued the investment company essentially on the basis of the market value of
the securities which constituted substantially all of its assets
rather than on the lower basis of its own outstanding stock.
The statutory scheme here is relatively straightforward.
Section 17 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C.
'iO (a)-17, forbids an "affiliated person," as defined in the Act/
,129 lT. :::l. 815 (1976) .
" Title 15 U. S. C. 80a-2 (a) (:3) definp;,; an •·affi liated pPrson" as follows:
(3) "Affiliated per::;on" of another person means (A) any person directly
or mrlirect ly owning, cont rolling, or holding with power to vote, 5 per
1
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to purchase any securities or other property from a registered
investment company unless the Commission finds, inter alia,
that the "evidence establishes that . . . the terms of the
proposed transaction, including the consideration to be paid or
received, are reasonable and fair and do not involve overrea,ching on the part of any person concerned.
"8

A
( 1) The merger in this case involves Christiana Securities
Company, a closed end, nondiversified management investment company, and E. I. duPont de Nemours and Company,
a large industrial operating company engaged principally in
the manufacture of chemical products. Christiana wa3
formed in 1915 in order to preserve family control of the
Du Pont Corporation. At the time the present merger negotiations were announced in April 1972, 98ro of Christiana's
assets consisted of Du Pont common stock. 4 This block of
Du Pont stock in turn comprised approximately 28.3% of the
outstanding common stock of the DuPont Corporation. 5 For
centum or more of the outstanding· voting securities ef such other person;
(B) any per::jon 5 per centum or more of whose outstanding voting
:;ecurities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled_, or held with power
to vote, by ~uch other per::;on; (C) any person di.rectly or indirectly
<'Ontrolling, cqntrolled by, or under common control with, such other
per;;on; (D) any officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of
-;uch other per::>on; (E) if ~:;uch other per::;on is an investment company,
ally mvcstment adviser thereof or any member of an advisory board
thereof; and (F) if such other person is an unincorporated investment
rompany not having a board of directors, the depositor thereof.
3 Section 17 (b) also requires that: i-t he proposed transaction be con,;istent with the policy of each registered investment company conC'('rned, and iJt-consistent with "the general purposes of this subchapter."
15 U. S. C. § 80a-17 (b) (2) (3) These criteria are not contested here.
4
Chri::;tiana own;; 13,417,120 ~ hares of Du Pont. It also holds a relat 1vely small amount of Du Pont preferred stock. Its other assets con~i~ t of two daily new::;paper::: in Wilmington, DeL, and 3.5% of the
~tock of the Wilmington Trust Company which, in turn, holds more than
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purposes of this litigation, Christiana has been presumed to
have at least the potential to control Du Pont, although it
submits that "this potential lies dormant and unexercised and
that there is no actual control relationship." Investment
Company Act Release No. 8615/December 13, 1974, 5 S. E. C.
Docket 745, 747 (1974).
Christiana itself has 11,710,103 shares of common stock
outstanding 6 and has about 8,000 shareholders. Unlike
DuPont stock, which is traded actively on the New York and
other national stock exchanges, Christiana shares are traded in
the over-the-counter market. Since virtually all of its assets
are Du Pont common stock, the market price of Christiana
shares reflects the market price of Du Pont stock. However,
as is often the case with closed end investment companies,
Christiana's own stock has historically sold at a discount from
the market value of its Du Pont holdings. 7 Apparently, this
discount is primarily tax related since Christiana pays a federal intercorporate tax on dividends. Its stockholders are
also subject to potential capital gains tax on the unrealized
appreciation of Christiana's Du Pont stock which has a very
low tax base. Additionally, the relatively limited market for
Christiana stock likely influences the discount.
In 1972, Christiana's management concluded that, because
of the tax disadvantages and the discount at which its shares
sold, Christiana should be liquidated and its stockholders
become direct owners of Du Pont stock. Christiana's board
one-half of Christiana's common stock as trustee. Investment Company
Act Relea-se No. 8615/December 13, 1974.
5 According to the applicants' "Notice of Filing of Application," Investment Company Act Release No. 7402, Du Pont has 47,566,694 shares of
common stock outt;t..-mding held by npproximiltely 224,964 shareholders.
0 95.5% of the::;e sha.res are held by 338 people.
Investment Company
A.ct Release No. 8615/DecembPr 13, 1974.
7 In the two yrar~ preceding the date of the announcement of the
merger negotiation~, this discount was generally in the range of 20-25%.
I uvestment C01;npany Act Rclense No 8615, December 13, 1974.
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of directors proposed liquidation of Christiana by means of a
tax-free merger into Du Pont Corporation. Du Pont would
purchase Christiana's assets by issuing to Christiana shareholders new certificates of Du Pont stock. In more concrete
terms, Du Pont would acquire Christiana's $2.2 billion assets
and assume its liabilities of approximately $300,000. In so
doing, Du Pont would acquire from Christiana 13,417,120
shares of its own common stock. Du Pont would then issue
13,228,620 of its shares directly to Christiana holders. This
would be 188,500 shares less than Du Pont would receive from
Christiana-a ratio of 1.123 shares of Du Pont for each share
of Christiana. This ratio was ascertained by taking the market price of Christiana's Du Pont stock and its other assets,
subtracting Christiana's relatively nominal liabilities, and
making certain other minor adjustments. Direct ownership
of Du Pont shares would increase the market value of the
Christiana shareholders' holdings and Du Pont would have
acquired Christiana's assets at a 2.5% discount from their net
value. The Internal Revenue Service ruled the merger would
be tax free.
(2) Du Pont and Christiana filed a joint application with
the Commission for exemption under § 17 of the Investment
Company Act. Administrative proceedings followed. The
Commission's Division of Investment Management Regulation supported the application. A relatively small number of
Du Pont shareholders, including the respondents in this case,
opposed the transaction. Their basic argument was that,
since Christiana was valued on the basis of its assets, Du Pont
stock, rather than the much lower market price of its own
outstanding stock, the proposed merger would be unfair to the
shareholders of Du Pont since it provides relatively greater
benefits to Christiana shareholders than to shareholders of
Du Pont. The objectmg stockholders argued that Du Pont
Corporation should receive a substantial share of the benefit
realized by Christiana shareholders from the elimination of

'

.
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the 23o/o discount from net asset va.lue at which Christiana
stock was selling. They also argued that the merger would
depress the market price of Du Pont stock because it would
place more than 13 million marketable Du Pont shares directly
in the hands of Christiana shareholders.
After the hearing, the parties waived the initial administrative recommendations a.nd the record was submitted
directly to the Commission. The Commission unanimously
granted the application. Basically, it viewed the proposed
transaction as a.n exchange of equivalents-Christiana's
Du Pont stock to be acquired by Du Pont in exchange for
Du Pont stock issued directly to Christiana shareholders. It
held that, for purposes of § 17 (b), the proper guide for
evaluating Christiana was the market price of Christiana's
holdings of DuPont stock:
"Here justice requires no ventures into the unknown and
the unknowable. An investment company, whose assets
consist entirely or almost entirely of securities, the prices
of which are determined in active and continuous markets, can normally be presumed to be worth its net asset
value. . . . The simple, readily usable tool of net asset
value does the job much better than an accurate guage of
market impact (were there one) could." 5 S. E. C.
Docket, at 751.
The fact that Du Pont might have obtained more favorable
tPrms because of its strategic bargaining position or by use of
alternative methods of liquidating Christiana was considered
110t relevant by the Commission. In its view, the purpose of
~ 17 was to prevent persons in a strategic position from getting
more than fair value. The Commission found no detriment
in the transaction to Du Pont or to the value of its outsta.ndi 11g shares. Any depressing effects on the price of Du Pont
would be brief in duration and the intrinsic value of an investmrnt in Du Pont would not be altered by the merger. Moreover, in the Commission's view, any valuation involving a

'

.
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significant departure from net asset value would "run afoul of
§ 17 (b)(1) of the Act"; it would strip long-term investors in
companies like Christiana of the intrinsic worth of the
securities which underlie their holdings.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit divided in setting aside the Commission's
determination. 523 F. 2d 584 (1976). 8 The majority held
that the Securities and Exchange Commission had erred, as a
matter of law, in determfning that Christiana should be presumptively valued on the basis of the market value of its
principal asset, common stock of Du Pont. "[I]n judging
transactions between dominant and subserviant pa.rties, the
test is 'whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain'
Peppe'r v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 306-307 ( 1939) (footnote
omitted)," 532 F. 2d, at 592. Employing this standard, the
Court of Appeals majority concluded the record did not support the Commission's finding that the terms of the merger
were "reasonable and fair" since the "economic benefits to
Christiana shareholders from the merger are immediate and
substantial,'' 532 F. 2d, at 601, while "benefits to present
Du Pont shareholders are minimal." I d., at 602. The court
concluded that, from Du Pont's viewpoint, "the degree of
[control] dispersion attained ... does not justify the substantial premium pa.id for the Christiana stock," id., at 603.
The panel also held that the Commission had erred in failing
to give weight to the "occasional detriment to Du Pont shareholders," id., a.t 605, caused by the increase of available
Du Pont stock in the market.
B
In determining whether the Court of Appeals correctly set
aside the order of the Commission, we begin by examining the
nature of the regulatory process whose decision that court was
~

A prtition for rchn.ring en bane was denied by an equally dividect

t:OI'Jrt.
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required to review. In United States v. National Assn. of
Securities Dea.lers, 422 U. S. 694 (1975), we noted that the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-1 et seq.,
"vests in the SEC broad regulatory authority over the business
practices of the investment companies." 422 U. S., at 704705. The Act was the product of congressional concern that
existing legislation in the securities field did not afford adequate protection to the purchasers of investment company
securities. Prior to the enactment of the legislation, Congress
mandated an intensive study of the investment company
industry. 9 One of the problems specifically identified was the
numerous transactions between investment companies and
persons affiliated with them which resulted in a distinct
advantage to the "insiders" over the public investors. 10 Section 17 was the specific congressional response to this problem.11 Congress therefore charged the Commission. in
scrutinizing a merger such as this, to take into account the
peculiar characteristics of such a transaction in the investment company industry. Recognizing that an "arm's length
bargain." cf. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), is rarely
a realistic possibility in transactions between an affiliate and
an investment company, CongTess substituted, in effect, the
informed judgment of the Commission to determine, inter alia,
n Section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 STAT 837,
15 U. S. C. § 792-4, mandated that, Congress undertake such a study.
See United States v. National Assn. of Sec'U1'ities Dealers, 422 U. S. 694,
704 (1975) .
"JO See gcnernlly Report on Investment Trust and Investment Companies,
Pt. III, c. IV, "ProblelTil:> in Connection with Shifts in Control, Mergers,
and Consolidatiom; of lnve:stment Companies." H . R. Doc. No. 279, 76th
Cong., 1st Se&-.., pp. 1017-1562.
H While the House and Senate Report;,; indicate that. the Congress'
thief concern wa.~ protection of the public investor::; of the investment
eompa.ny, S. Rep. No. 1175, 76th Cong., 3d Ses;,;., 14 (1940); H. R. Rep.
No. 2639, /nth Con g., ;)ct Se:ss., 9 ( 1940), the :;tatute has been construed
lo afford protection to the ~t.ockholdcr::; of the affiliate as well. See FiftA
.1t•entte Cooch Lines, Inc , -n Fl E. C' 6:35, 639 (1967).
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whether the transaction was "reasonable and fair and did not
involve overreaching on the part of any person concerned." 12
Given the wide variety of possible transactions between
an investment company and its affiliates, Congress, quite
understandably, made no attempt to define this standard with
any greater precision. Instead, it followed the practice frequently employed in other administrative schemes. The
language of the statute was cast in broad terms and designed
to encompass all situations falling within the scope of the
statute; an agency with great experience in the industry was
given the task of applying those criteria to particular business
situations in a manner consistent with the legislative intent. 13

c
In this case, a judgment as to whether the terms of the
merger were "fair and reasonable" turned upon the value
assigned to Christiana. In making such an evaluation, the
Commission concluded that "[t]he single, readily usable tool
of net asset value does the job much better than an accura.te
guage of market impact. . . . " 5 S. E. C. Docket, at 751.
Investment companies, it reasoned, are essentially a portfolio
of securities whose individual prices are determined by the
forces of the securities marketplace. In determining value in
merger situations, "asset value" is thus much more applicable
15 U. S. C. 80a-17 (b) (1).
Thi::; situation is quite different from that which confronted the Court
Parlier this Term in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries. U.S.- (1977).
There, the Court held that "the narrow legal issue" of implying a private
right of action under thP sPcuritie::; laws wa::; "one peculiarly reserved for
JUdicial re:>olution" nnd that the experience of t.he Commission on such a
U. S. n. 27. Moreover, the
question was of ''limitPd value." Commission's Chairman, in te;;timony before Congress on the relevant
legi;;lation, had taken a pot<ition opposed to that asserted by the Commission';; amicus brief in Piper. By contrast, this case does not involvo
a purely legal dPtrrmination but, rather, an assessment as to whether a
given bu;;ine"" a rrang<'ment. i::; compatible with the regulatory scheme
which the agnl('y is charged hy Congress to administer.
12

13

'

.
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to investment companies than to other corporate entities.
The value of the securities surrendered is, basically, the real
value received by the transferee.
In reviewing a decision of the Commission, a court must
consider both the facts found and the application of the
relevant statute by the agency. Congress has mandated that,
in review of§ 17 proceedings, "[t]he findings of the Commission as to facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive." 15 U. S. C. § 80a-42. A reviewing court is also
to be guided by the "venerable principle that the construction
of a statute by those charged with its execution should be
followed unless there are compelling indications that it is
wrong. . . . " Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367,
381 (1969). "[C]ontemporaneous construction is entitled to
great weight ... even though it was a.pplied in cases settled
by consent rather than by litigation." F'PC v. Ma.n del Bros.,
359 U. S. 385 (1959). Here, however, the Court of Appeals
held, as a matter of law, that the Commission erred in the
method applied in passing on the merger, thus all but ignoring
the congressional limitations on judicial review of agency
action.
The Commission has long recognized that the key factor in
the valuation of the assets of a closed end investment company sh01 ti I be the market price of the underlying securities.
This metlvJd of setting the value of investment companies is,
as CongrC'ss contemplated, the product of the agency's long
and intimate familiarity with the investment company
industry. For instance, in issuing an advisory report to
the United States District Court pursuant to § 1703 of
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, the Commission advised
that "it is natural that net asset value based upon market
prices should be the fundamental valuation criterion used by
and large in the investment company field." Central States
Electric Corporation, 30 S. E. C. 680, 700 (1949), approved,
sub nom. Central States Electric Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F. 2d
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879, 884 (CA4 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 917 (1951).,,
Similarly, in mergers like the one presented in this case, the
Commission has used "net asset value" as a touchstone in its
analysis. See, e. g., Delaware Realty and Investment Company, 40 S. E. C. 469, 473 (1961); Harbor Plywood Corp. and
Hunt Foods and Industries, Inc., 40 S. E. C. 1002 (1962);
Eastern States Corporation, Investment Company Act Releases Nos. 5693 and 5711 (1969). 14
Moreover, despite the characterization of the Court of
Appeals to the contrary, the Commission did not employ a
mechanical application of a rule or "presumption." It considered carefully the contentions of the respondents that a
departure from the use of net asset value was warranted in
this case. Upon analysis, it concluded that the central and
controlling aspect of the merger remained the fact that it
consisted of an exchange of Du Pont common stock for
Du Pont common stock; it was not Christiana stock but
Du Pont stock which Du Pont was receiving in the merger.
As to the claim that Du Pont stock would be adversely
affected over an extended period of time by volume selling,
the Commission concluded there was no indication of a long
term adverse market impact. It noted that Christiana stock
This method of valuation of closed end investment companies was
employed in Elt, Inc., Investment Company Act Release Nos.
X675 and 8714, Chemical Fund, Inc., Investment Company Act Release
No. 8773, The Citizens and Southern Capital Corp., Investment Company Act Release Nos. 7755 and 7802, Detroit and Cleveland Navigatwn Company, Investment Company Act Release Nos. 3082 and 3099,
Cheapside Dollar Fund Limited, Investment Company Act Release Nos.
7053 and 7094. The Commission has, of course, required that such.valuatJOns be adjusted to reflect such factors as expenses of the merger and
tnx considerations. Tally Industries, Inc., Investment Company Act
Hrlease No. 5953 and Electric Bond and Share Company, Investment
Company Act Relra.se No. 5215, cited by the Court of Appeals, did not
rely on net asset \'alue ,.;incr the companies held substantial assets other
than securitie::;. While Chri:stiana also had some assets other than Du
Pnnt, stock, they amounted to only 2% of its assets.
1 "1

~imilarly

'
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was held principally by long term investors. There was no
evidence that Christiana stockholders, who for years had been
indirect investors in Du Pont, would now change the essential
nature of their investment.
The Commission's reliance on "net asset value'' in this
particular case and its consequent determination that the
proposed merger met the statutory standards thus rested
"squarely in that area where administrative judgments are
entitled to the greatest amount of weight by the appellate
courts. It is the product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the
statutory policies, and reasonable treatment of the uncontested facts." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 209
( 1947). In rejecting the conclusion of the Commission, the
Court of Appeals substituted its own judgment for that of the
agency charged by Congress with that responsibility. Indeed,
after receiving briefs in oral argument, the Court of
Appeals-over the objection of the Commission, Christiana
and Du Pont--undertook the unique appellate procedure of
employing a university professor to assist the court in understanding the record in this case and to prepare reports and
memoranda for the court. Thus, the reports relied upon by
that court included a variety of data and economic observations which had not been examined and tested by the traditional methods of the adversary process. We are not cited to
any statute, rule, or decision authorizing the procedure
employed by the Court of Appeals. Cf. Fed. Rule App.
Proc. 16.
In our view. the Court of Appeals clearly departed from its
' tatutory appellate function and applied an erroneous standard in its review of the decision of the Corrunission. The
record made by the parties before the Commission was in
accord with traditional procedures and that record clearly
revea.ls substantial evidence to support the findings of the
Commission . Moreover, the agency conclusions of law were
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based on a construction of the statute consistent with the
legislative intent. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed.
Reversed.

MR.

JusTICE REHNQUIST
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or decision of this case.
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